Rob Manfred’s reign as MLB commissioner began on the offensive. Or was it the defensive? That probably depends on how you feel about shifts. During an interview with ESPN, the new commissioner casually stated he would be “open to eliminating shifts” in an effort to “inject additional offense” into the game. Although a small part of Manfred’s interview, the immediate vocal reaction to that statement was not only negative, but overwhelmed other, arguably more important proposed initiatives. Since then, Manfred has clarified his statement, but is his position on shifts still off base?
There are two elements of Manfred’s statement worth considering. The first is whether the decline in runs scored represents a problem that needs to be fixed. After all, it wasn’t too long ago that inflated offensive totals were a bane. Is it really in baseball’s best interest to strike a balance between offense and pitching, or is the public perception always going to view the grass as being greener on the other side of the run scoring spectrum? That question is hard to answer, but it’s worth noting that baseball currently enjoys near-record attendance levels, strong regional ratings, and exploding revenue. So, even if fans prefer more offense, there’s no evidence to suggest the recent decline in runs per game is hurting baseball’s popularity.
Runs Per Game, 1994 to 2014
Source: baseball-reference.com
If we assume fans are pining for more runs, is eliminating shifts the best way to go about boosting offense? That brings us to the second part of the new commissioner’s statement. Some of the immediate critics of Manfred’s proposal have cited statistics like BABIP and wOBAcon to definitively state that shifts have little to no effect on overall offensive levels, but that analysis is too simplistic. After all, these arguments ignore the potential impact that shifts could have on balls that aren’t put into play. For example, what if hitters are over-compensating in an attempt to beat the shift, either by hitting away from or over the realignment of the defense? Intuitively, a hitter deviating from his comfort zone would not only be prone to more swings and misses, but also weaker contact, and these impacts would undoubtedly weigh negatively on his performance. Stats based on balls in play would not be able to detect this relationship, so using them to analyze the effects of defensive shifts on offense is limited.
BABIP and Strike Out Rates, 1994 to 2004
Source: fangraphs.com
Is there a way to determine if defensive shifts are having a more subtle dampening effect on run scoring? Without access to pitch-by-pitch, results-based data when shifts are employed, regardless of whether the ball is put in play, it’s impossible to comprehensively approach the question. However, we can take an anecdotal look. The chart below compares the cumulative strikeout rate of the hitters who encountered the most shifts in 2013 versus the same group’s strikeout rate in 2009. Although several players on the list did experience depressed BABIP rates with the shift employed, the cumulative strike out rate didn’t increase significantly. In fact, the 2.6% increase for the subset was lower than the greater than 11% increase experienced by the rest of the league over the same timespan.
Comparative Strikeout Rates of Most Shifted Upon Hitters, 2009 vs. 2013
Note: Includes 21 players who faced 75 or more shifts in 2013 and were active in 2009. Number of shifts is based on ball in play outcomes only.
Source: Hardball Times (shift and BABIP data) and fangraphs.com (K rates)
Although the analysis above throws a little cold water on the idea that shifts could be contributing to strikeouts, it doesn’t answer the question definitively. For starters, the data above doesn’t take into account the possibility that the hitters included in the 2013 subset were already being exposed to the shift in 2009. It also doesn’t account for improvement in plate discipline as hitters gain experience, nor make accommodation for the disproportionate impact of David Ortiz’ historic strikeout decline during the period in question. Also, the players considered faced approximately 2,500 shifts, or nearly 11,000 fewer than the total amount deployed, leaving open the possibility that the impact of the shift on strikeouts might be more pronounced further down the food chain. Nonetheless, this comparison is another suggestion that maybe shifts aren’t having a significant limiting effect on offense.
So, if shifts don’t prevent runs, why are teams increasingly using them? At Bill James Online, John Dewan came to the conclusion that in 2014 shifts saved 195 runs per game (based on analysis of play by play data when shifts are in use), or approximately 1% of the league total. Even considering the limitation of ball-in-play data, this estimate is another argument against the run thwarting impact of shifts. Or, is it? More important than Dewan’s run saved calculation is the total number of shifts that were employed in 2014. Even though the strategy has increased exponentially since 2010, last year’s total of 13,296 shifts means a defensive alignment was used on only 10.6% of all balls put into play. Although that relatively limited use of shifts likely means they can’t be held responsible for the recent decline in offense, there is reason to believe that, if expanded, they would exacerbate the “problem”. If Dewan’s analysis is correct, Manfred’s edict wouldn’t necessarily restore run scoring to decade-ago levels, but it might prevent offensive levels from declining further.
Shifts Employed vs. Total Balls in Play
Source: Bill James Online (shifts and runs saved) and baseball-reference.com (total balls in play)
One more argument in favor of at least considering the limitation or even elimination of shifts is more aesthetic than statistical. There’s something to be said for wanting a well struck ball to be a hit and a routine grounder to be turned into an out. The fact that they may cancel each other out isn’t a consolation. On the contrary, if the net effect is the same, and there is no significant strategic advantage to employing a shift, then why not come down on the side of what “seems right”?
As long as Rob Manfred is committed to doing a thoughtful and thorough analysis of whether shifts are limiting offense to an undesirable degree, or having any other negative impact, baseball fans should welcome his vigilance and attention to detail, especially if the discussion includes perspective throughout the game. Although “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” certainly applies to baseball in 2015 (regardless of the conventional wisdom), it doesn’t hurt to kick the tires every now and then. Such changes are neither reactionary nor visionary, but if considered prudently, could actually improve upon perfection.
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