What you think of the Yankees’ pitching staff probably depends on the statistic used for evaluation. By traditional measures, the Bronx Bombers’ pitchers are decidedly mediocre, while more advanced metrics place them among the best in the league. What explains this divergence? And what does the variance portend?
In terms of runs allowed per game, the Yankees rank fifth from the bottom, with an average rate that is one-quarter run higher than the rest of the league. Earned run average is a little kinder. The Yankees’ ERA of 4.31 is also below average, but when adjusted to ballpark, the resultant ERA+ of 99 suggests a pitching staff more in line with the mean. When it comes to fielding independent pitching (FIP) stats, however, the Bronx Bombers’ pitchers start to standout. The Yankees’ FIP of 3.78 ranks in the top half of the American League, while the adjusted version of that metric (xFIP) moves the Bronx Bombers to the head of the class. If only the Yankees could figure out how get the strength of their pitchers’ peripheral performance to match what is reflected on the scoreboard.
Yankees’ Pitchers vs. American League
Note: BABIP multiplied by 100 for scaling purposes.
Source: baseball-reference.com and fangraphs.com
The Yankees’ pitching staff has had two glaring problems this season: it has allowed the most home runs per nine innings in the majors and suffered the fourth highest BABIP. That’s why the team’s pitchers rate much better when using FIP statistics, which assume the normalization of home runs allowed and batting average on balls in play. If the theory holds, the Yankees can expect improved aggregate performance from their pitching staff. However, when it comes to BABIP, there is reason to believe the team’s inflated rate isn’t about to level off anytime soon.
Although luck certainly impacts BABIP, the quality of a team’s defense plays a significant role. That’s bad news for the Yankees, who rank third from the bottom in Baseball Prospectus’ defensive efficiency rating and among the bottom third in ultimate zone rating. The Bronx Bombers also rate poorly in terms of double plays. The team’s infield has converted only 11.1% of double play opportunities, according to BP, which again places them in the lower third of the league. Because the numbers confirm observation, it seems fair to say the Yankees do not have a very good defense, especially on the infield, where age and players being out of position are taking a toll.
Perhaps to compensate for expected weakness on the infield, the Yankees have become one of the most aggressive users of defensive shifts. However, the team’s poor conversion rates suggest the possibility that shifting too much may be exacerbating its weakness on defense. After all, shifts are mostly based on data compiled against hitters when they weren’t facing a shift (very few hitters, like David Ortiz, for example, have a long history of facing shifts). In other words, the spray charts are only relevant for hitters who do not have the skill to adjust. Throwing a net of shifts over all hitters will certainly catch the ones who are one-dimensional, but it will also expose the defense when facing more well-rounded hitters. Does one set of outcomes offset the other? Whether or not, this dichotomy suggests that the optimal shifting strategy is based on balance, not a blanket approach.
Teams have been shifting on David Ortiz for years, but most players do not have a track record against defensive alignments. (Photo: SI)
In addition to examining the extent to which they have employed defensive shifts, the Yankees (and all teams) should also consider whether or not they have the personnel to execute them properly. Moving infielders around the diamond can close hitting lanes, but it can also expose the weaknesses of defenders. For example, if a second baseman doesn’t have a strong arm, positioning him deep on the outfield grass might not be effective. Similarly, just because a strategy makes sense on paper doesn’t mean the players are prepared to implement it. There have been many recent examples of the Yankees being out of position because of the shift, and, therefore, unable to execute fundamental tasks like turning double plays and defending sacrifice bunts. By working against the defense’s “second nature”, shifts have created a learning curve that might be difficult to master in one season, especially for a team with older dogs incapable of learning new tricks.
Using data to optimize defense alignments is the kind of analytical edge every team should seek to achieve. In doing so, however, they need to be mindful of context, especially the skillset of the opposing hitters and athletic ability and instinct of the team’s own defenders. It takes imagination to implement a new strategy, but the hard reality of making it actually work involves constant evaluation and refinement. The Yankees have made the leap into defensive analytics, but did they look closely enough before doing so? Whether a change in strategy or personnel is needed, or a combination of both, the Yankees need to turn more balls into outs because fielding independent pitching only exists on paper, and that’s not where games are won.
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